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Abstract 
The Candidate List of the European Union regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorization, 
and restriction of chemicals—known as REACH— gives advanced information to industry and other 
stakeholders about substances that may have serious effects on human health and the environment—
known as substances of very high concern (SVHCs). Both the European Chemical Agency and EEA 
Member States can prepare dossiers proposing substances to be considered for inclusion on the 
Candidate List. This study investigates what types of SVHCs are suggested by different countries, and 
in particular, how the national production of the substances and their toxicological properties can 
affect the countries’ decision to submit a dossier. Moreover, I investigate what substances for which a 
dossier has been submitted are finally put forward for inclusion on the Candidate List and what types 
of comments are raised during the public consultation allowing stakeholders to provide further 
information on the properties of the substance. The results indicate that national economic interests 
have affected not only the decisions to submit a dossier but also what substances to propose for 
inclusion on the list, where countries submit dossiers mainly for substances where they expect little 
opposition from other member countries or from domestic actors. 
 
JEL Codes: Q52, Q53, Q58. 
Key Words: chemical regulation, hazardous substances, mandatory disclosure, political 
economy, Candidate List, REACH. 
 
1 Introduction 
Exposure to tens of thousands of chemicals constitutes a major threat to human health and the 
environment. In recent years, the public perception of the potential hazards associated with the use 
and consumption of chemicals has significantly increased. A growing body of evidence indicates that 
many chemicals have biological effects at doses previously considered negligible (Vandenberg et al. 
2012). It is also becoming increasingly evident that long-term exposure to relatively low doses of 
chemicals can cause subtle harmful effects (Birnbaum 2012). Furthermore, people and ecosystems are 
exposed to mixtures of thousands of chemicals from a wide range of sources, which can be 
detrimental since low and supposedly safe levels of some chemicals can become hazardous when the 
substances are used in combination with others (Sarigiannis and Hansen 2012). Thus, there is a need 
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to regulate chemicals to prevent the release of new chemicals with a potential to damage human 
health and the environment into the marketplace without safety testing, and to provide incentives for 
the development of products and processes that minimize the use and generation of hazardous 
substances. 
The European regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of 
Chemicals, i.e., the REACH regulation (Regulation [EC] No 1907/2006), addresses the production 
and use of chemical substances with a main objective to ensure a high level of protection of human 
health and the environment. REACH requires all companies manufacturing or importing chemical 
substances into the EU in quantities of one metric ton or more per year to provide a safety-related 
dataset for a large number of existing and new chemicals to the agency established to manage the 
technical, scientific, and administrative aspects of REACH -- the European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA). REACH entered into force in 2007 and applies to countries in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), i.e., all European Union (EU) members plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. An 
important objective of the REACH regulation is to assure that the risks posed by substances that may 
have serious effects on human health and the environment—known as substances of very high 
concern (SVHCs)—are properly controlled and progressively replaced with suitable alternative 
substances or technologies. This is mainly achieved through the so-called Authorization List and 
Candidate List of SVHCs.  
Substances that are placed on the Authorization List cannot be made available in the market for use 
unless an authorization is granted by the European Commission (EC), and inclusion of a substance on 
the Candidate List is a prerequisite for inclusion on the Authorization List (ECHA 2016). The 
REACH Directive states that authorization should be granted only if the registrant demonstrates that 
(i) the risks are adequately controlled or (ii) the substance provides socio-economic advantages that 
outweigh the risks and no suitable alternative substances or technologies are available (Bergkamp and 
Herbatschek 2014). Thus, the burden of proof lies with the firms, which must apply for authorization 
by a deadline established under the REACH Directive and cease use of the chemical by a specified 
date unless authorization is granted or an application for authorization is pending.  
Although substances included on the Candidate List are not banned for use, the inclusion brings 
obligations for producers, importers, and distributors of the substance to communicate information 
about its risks, use, and risk management. For example, they need to supply a safety data sheet, 
communicate on how it can be used safely, respond to consumer requests, and notify ECHA if the 
article they produce contains an SVHC in quantities above one metric ton per producer/importer per 
year (ECHA 2019a). When a substance is identified as an SVHC, it signals to the companies that they 
need to find substitutes or switch to other technologies. In addition to increasing awareness about 
hazardous chemicals, listing might also encourage companies not to seek authorization in order to 
avoid having the company name associated with controversial substances, even if the benefit-cost 
case for authorization is strong (see, e.g., Coria 2018).  
The positive economic theory of regulation sees regulation as a form of wealth transfer where interest 
groups (e.g., consumers and regulated firms) compete against each other in the political arena to shape 
regulatory initiatives in a way that will serve their own objectives (see, e.g., Sterner and Coria 2016). 
In the case of SVHCs, in order to include a substance as an SVHC on the Candidate List, it first needs 
to be proposed. This can be done by member states and the European Commission (EC) (through 
ECHA). If a substance is proposed as being an SVHC, a dossier needs to be submitted and a 45-day 
consultation period starts, during which anyone can comment and provide further information on the 
properties of the substance, its uses, and available alternatives. A proposed substance is included on 
the Candidate List if no comments challenging the identification of a substance as an SVHC have 
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been received or if the Member State Committee (MSC) agrees on the identification of the substance 
as an SVHC after taking into account the comments submitted during the public consultation period 
(see, e.g., Schenten and Führ 2016). The MSC is a body of ECHA consisting of national 
representatives, one per Member State, usually from the national regulatory authority dealing with 
chemicals. The MSC, however, is not a clear-cut technical committee; although it consists of experts 
from national regulatory authorities, it is political in the sense that national interests are explicitly 
represented in committee deliberations (Klika, 2015a). Particularly since when decision makers 
launch a legislative initiative that affects the economic interests of certain groups, these groups have 
an incentive to shape the debate to have an impact on the policy options that are considered by 
decision makers and on the final outcome of the legislative debate (Klika, 2015b, and Klüver et al. 
2015). Thus, those nominated for the MSC are wearing multiple “hats,” serving as members of an EU 
agency committee, policy experts, and representatives of national interests at the same time (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2009).  
It has been argued that the Candidate List and the authorization procedure are increasingly being 
politically exploited since the EC has set targets for the inclusion of a given number of substances on 
the list by the end of given years (Hanschimdt et al. 2013). These targets have been criticized because 
they (may) put the emphasis on the political signaling effect of the Candidate List rather than on the 
protection of health and the environment. Moreover, compliance with the targets might not allow 
performing the necessary analyses concerning uses and best risk management methods for the 
substances listed.1 Nevertheless, in contrast to this argument, the evidence suggests that the process of 
including substances on the Candidate List has been rather slow. For example, EC (2006) estimated 
that about 1,500 substances are known to have SVHC properties. 2 However, only 197 substances had 
been included on the Candidate List by February 2019.  
Political considerations might however play an important role in the process of including substances 
on the Candidate List since national interests are represented both when proposing substances and in 
the deliberation process. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the political economy of the 
Candidate List by (i) analyzing countries’ incentives for preparing SVHC dossiers, and (ii) analyzing 
the participation of different actors in the consultation process through which further information on 
the properties of the substances and their uses and alternatives is provided. Regarding incentives, the 
study aims to investigate whether the decision to submit a dossier is connected to the national 
environmental damages related to the use of the substances and/or to local production. Regarding the 
consultation process, the aim is to identify the identity of the parties commenting and whether the 
arguments provided support or oppose inclusion on the Candidate List. 
The fact that interest groups influence the final design of environmental policies is well documented. 
Fuel taxation is a good example of how politically difficult it can be to implement policies even when 
they are environmentally beneficial, and how policy design evolves through political processes in 
which various stakeholders compete. For instance, Hammar et al. (2004) investigate the political 
economy of fuel taxation and find that fuel taxes are particularly difficult to implement in countries 
                                                     
1 For instance, the first target was to reach an inclusion of 136 substances on the Candidate List by the end of 
2012. ECHA prepared inclusion dossiers for 42 substances in 2012 and 11 substances in 2011 (compared with 
three in 2008 and two in 2009), which allowed them to reach the target with a total of 138 substances on the 
Candidate List by 2012. In 2013, ECHA implemented “the roadmap for SVHC identification and 
implementation of REACH risk management measures from now to 2020,” with the aim of presenting a credible 
process to ensure that the 2020 commitment be achieved (see e.g., EC 2013 and EEB 2015). The SVHC 
Roadmap constitutes an EU-wide commitment and outlines a methodology for working to fulfill the 
commitment (ECHA, 2018). 
2 Of the 1,500 substances, 900 are known to have SVHC properties and 600 are expected to become known 
through the generated data in the REACH regulation (EC, 2006).  
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with low fuel prices and high demand, and that one of the main explanations for this is that political 
pressure influences political decisions about taxation; high levels of fuel consumption make 
consumers more likely to oppose increased fuel taxes, whereas at lower levels of fuel consumption, 
consumers are more likely to tolerate them. Climate policy provides another good example. Kolk and 
Pinkse (2007) analyze the multinationals’ political activities on climate change and show that instead 
of trying to stop policy makers from doing something to combat rising GHG emissions, many firms 
have taken a more cooperative approach by aiming to push policy makers in the direction of market-
based solutions such as emissions trading and voluntary programs that would allow some segments of 
the polluting industry to gain rather than lose from the implementation of the respective policies. 
The present article contributes to the literature on chemical regulation because listing of hazardous 
substances has become a policy instrument commonly used worldwide (see, e.g., the Consolidated 
List of Chemicals Subject to the Emergency Planning and Community Right to-Know Act by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Pesticide Action Network List of Highly 
Hazardous Pesticides, and the European List of Hazardous Waste). Even though the article has a 
primarily explorative and descriptive purpose, insights on the various key drivers of the decision to 
submit a dossier and on the deliberation process are crucial in order to understand what type of 
substances are being listed.  
The article also contributes to the literature on political economy of environmental policy because 
lobbying is a primary avenue through which firms attempt to change economic policy (Mitra 1999). 
Much of the time, firms lobby against environmental protection, but there are also examples of major 
polluting firms lobbying for environmental regulation of their markets, and this political support can 
substantially increase the ability of governments to protect the environment. For instance, firms might 
lobby for environmental protection when they have already made some investments in cleaner 
production technologies and stronger environmental regulations could provide them with a 
competitive advantage over their rivals (Grey 2018). An example of this concerns the regulation of 
the use phosphates in laundry detergents, identified in the 1970s as a driver of lake eutrophication in 
both North America and Europe. In response to such concerns, the German firm Henkel invested in a 
phosphate-free detergent, and lobbied for controls. The German government implemented regulations 
requiring phosphates to be reduced by 50% by 1984. Henkel profited from phosphate regulation since 
its phosphate-free detergent proved so successful that detergents containing phosphates were phased 
out in Germany by 1989 (Barrett 1992).  
Furthermore, the present paper provides evidence of the intensity of lobbying activities in the 
regulation of SVHC (measured by the input provided to the deliberation process) and insights 
regarding the framing used by different interest groups. Even though many scholars claim that 
participation of interest groups enhances the democratic legitimacy of the EU policy making, 
empirical evidence suggests a strong pro-business character of the policy making process as business 
and industry interests are considerably better represented in the consultation than the interests of the 
environment, trade unions, and consumers (Eising 2004). For instance, Persson (2007) investigated 
the public internet consultation of the policy proposal of the REACH regulation and found that 
participation by industry associations and businesses greatly outnumbered NGOs and representatives 
of diffuse interests and that chemical-producing countries were much better represented than other 
countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes major advocacies affecting chemical regulation 
in Europe and the process through which SVHCs are listed. Section 3 describes the RoI database and 
provides an overview of the information available so far. Section 4 describes the main findings of the 
analysis, and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2 EU Major Chemical Policy Advocacies and the Candidate List 
 
Within the chemicals policy debate, two major advocacy coalitions are expected to shape decision 
making. The business coalition consists of industry and business; they have a strong influence on 
decision makers due to the dependency of governmental actors on knowledge from business actors for 
effective policy making. The chemicals industry, for example, has the great advantage of possessing 
knowledge about not only chemicals and products but also possible substitutes. This knowledge is 
vastly superior to that of public authorities (Pesendorfer 2006). EU member states with a large 
chemical sector are also expected to be important actors within the business coalition (Pesendorfer 
2006).  
The second advocacy coalition is the green coalition, the members of which share an environmentalist 
approach. The strongest supporters of a radical change in chemicals policy are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which play a crucial role countervailing power of business associations and 
chemicals industry. Main NGOs that are active in the area of chemicals include the European 
Environmental Bureau, which is a federation of over 140 national environmental NGOs, the European 
Consumers’ Organization, a federation of 40 national consumer NGOs, and a large number of 
individual NGOs, such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of the Earth, and 
Greenpeace (Selin 2007). However, NGOs have limited influence on policy making at the EU and 
member state levels. In fact, their influence is reduced mainly to agenda-setting and policy 
formulation. In decision making, they are much weaker than industry actors (Pesendorfer 2006).  
Efforts to strengthen European protection standards are also often supported by the public. For 
instance, in the Eurobarometer from 2016, Europeans expressed great concern about being exposed to 
hazardous chemicals, although less than half felt well informed. In general, people in northern Europe 
appear to be somewhat less concerned than people in other parts of the EU. The perception of 
knowledge about the potential dangers of chemicals contained in different products seems to be also 
higher in northern Europe where respondents feel well informed about the potential dangers of 
chemicals contained in different products, especially in the Nordic countries, while those in southern 
Europe tend to feel less well informed. Furthermore, a majority of the individuals in some of the 
countries surveyed responded that the current level of regulation and standards in the EU is not high 
enough and should be increased, though this proportion varied considerably by Member State (see 
Figure 1). 
Finally, the representatives of environmental ministries and national environmental agencies can be 
identified as more moderate and closer to the business coalition approach, sometimes functioning as 
policy brokers trying to find win-win solutions. This is true especially with regard to policy 
formulation and implementation that requires highly specific knowledge, making these actors largely 
dependent on close cooperation with industry. Furthermore, it is worth noting that northern member 
states including Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and the UK are said to be 
early initiators of revisions to EU chemicals policy and regulation (see, e.g., Selin 2007). The 
environmental ministers of these states have also been consistent supporters of REACH. This support 
is partly based on a desire to export their stricter domestic chemicals standards and policies to the 
European level, alongside efforts to further strengthen their domestic regulations. 
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Figure 1: Attitudes to chemicals in EU countries (Special Eurobarometer 456, 2016) 
 
 
EU Chemical Industry 
The EU chemical industry is the world’s second largest chemical producer, with €542 billion in sales 
in 2017, corresponding to 15.6% of total global revenues (Cefic 2018b).3 China was the world’s 
largest producer, with 37.2% of total global sales that year. Although the EU chemical sales have been 
growing continuously, the EU contribution to total world chemical sales dropped from 27.5% in 2007 
to 15.6% in 2017, whereas Asia has continuously increased its share (Cefic 2018b).  
The output from the EU chemical industry includes three product areas: (1) base chemicals, which in 
2017 represented 58.8% of total EU chemical sales and are produced in large volumes and sold in the 
chemical industry itself or to other industries (including petrochemicals, polymers, and basic 
inorganics), (2) specialty chemicals (e.g., paints and inks, crop protection, dye, and pigments), which 
in 2017 represented 27.4% of total EU chemical sales, (3) consumer chemicals (e.g., soaps, 
detergents, and cosmetics), which in 2017 represented 14.1% of total EU chemical sales and are sold 
to final consumers (Cefic 2018b). 
In 2017, Germany and France were the two largest chemical producers in the EU, followed by Italy 
and the Netherlands (Cefic 2018b). Together, these four countries generated €334.1 billion in 
chemical sales, which corresponds to 61.6% of the EU total. When including Belgium, Spain, and the 
UK, which are the fifth, sixth, and seventh largest chemical producers, the figure increases to €449.2 
billion, or 82.9%. For the remaining EU member states, the share was 17.1% of total EU chemical 
sales.  
In 2016, the chemical industry in EU28 consisted of about 28,000 companies and about 1.14 million 
direct employees, and the chemical industry generated 1.1% of the EU gross domestic product (GDP) 
                                                     
3 EU refers to EU28.  
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(Cefic 2018a). Figure 2 shows the total revenues in the European chemical sector. Germany is the 
country with highest total revenues, with more than double the figure of France, which has the second 
highest number. Then come Belgium, Spain, United Kingdom, and Italy. Figure 2 also shows the 
number of companies in the European chemical sector by country. Germany, the country with the 
highest total sales, had the eighth highest number of companies. Turkey tops the list, with just over 
20,000 companies, and is followed by Poland, United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy.  
 
 
Figure 2. Total revenues and number of companies by country in the European chemical sector. 
Source: The European Chemical Industry Council, Cefic (2018a) 
 
Candidate List under the REACH regulation 
The main purpose of the authorization procedure is to ensure that SVHCs are replaced with less 
dangerous substances or technologies whenever technically and economically feasible alternatives are 
available. SVHCs are chemicals classified as (i) carcinogenic, mutagenic, or toxic for reproduction, 
(ii) persistent, bio accumulative, and toxic chemicals (PBT); or very persistent and very bio 
accumulative chemicals (vPvB), (iii) substances that give “rise to an equivalent level of concern” such 
as endocrine-disrupting chemicals, or (iv) chemicals that meet more than one of the previous three 
criteria. Inclusion of an SVHC on the Candidate List, which is a prerequisite for inclusion on the 
Authorization List, involves several steps and actors (ECHA 2019a):  
(1) The process starts when member states or ECHA (on behalf of the EC) identify a concern that a 
certain substance poses a risk to human health or the environment. The intention to propose a 
substance for identification as an SVHC is published in the Registry of Intentions (RoI) on 
ECHA’s website before the proposal is submitted to inform industry and other stakeholders in 
advance of the submission. 
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(2) The proposal is prepared according to Annex XV to REACH and includes data and justification 
for identifying the substance as an SVHC, along with information on volumes in the EU market, 
uses, and possible alternatives to the substance.  
(3) The proposal is published on ECHA’s website. During a 45-day consultation period, anyone can 
comment and provide further information on the properties of the substance, its uses, and possible 
alternatives.  
(4) If no comments challenging the identification as an SVHC are received, the substance is included 
directly on the Candidate List. If comments providing new information or challenging the basis 
for the identification as an SVHC are received, the proposal and the comments are referred to the 
MSC for consideration. If the members of the committee agree unanimously that the substance 
should be identified as an SVHC, the substance is added to the Candidate List. If the committee 
does not reach a unanimous agreement, the matter is referred to the Commission. 
(5) When a substance is identified as an SVHC, it is added to the Candidate List for possible 
inclusion on the Authorization List. 
As described earlier, inclusion of a substance on the Candidate List brings obligations for suppliers of 
the substance to supply information to downstream consumers about the toxicological properties of 
the substance. Evidence suggests that inclusion on the Candidate List provides an early warning to 
firms to replace SVHCs, and it has been an important driver of substitution (see, e.g., Coria 2018).    
3. Registry of Intentions 
In this paper I make use of the information available on the Registry of Intentions, RoI. The aim of 
RoI is to make all interested parties aware of the substances for which a SVHC dossier is intended to 
be submitted to ECHA (ECHA 2019b). The information on the RoI is updated when the substance 
moves between different stages of the process, such as when the dossier is submitted or if it is 
withdrawn. Interested parties can follow the processing of the dossier from the notification of the 
intention until the outcome by regularly reviewing the RoI (ECHA 2019b). Furthermore, through RoI 
anyone with relevant information on the identity or hazard properties of a registered substance may 
submit such information during the public consultation. 
The first SVHCs to be proposed for inclusion on the Candidate List were proposed on June 2008. As 
of February 2019, the RoI database contained 216 unique substances/entries classified according to 
five possible statuses (see Table 1). Of the 216 dossiers submitted at that time, nine had been 
withdrawn, 195 substances had already been identified as SVHCs, and 12 dossiers were in the process 
of being identified as SVHCs. For those substances already identified as SVHCs, the length of time 
that elapsed from the notification of the intention until the outcome corresponded to about 260 days 
(with a range of 110–1,329 days). The length of time was significantly longer for the substances that 
had been withdrawn (i.e., 1,495 days on average). For most of these substances, the dossier was never 
submitted.  
A total of 3,214 comments had been submitted for 195 substances, implying an average of about 16 
comments per substance (with a range of 5–115 comments and a median of 12 comments per 
substance). 
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Status # Substances Average               
# Comments 
Time elapsed from 
intention to 
outcome (days) 
Intention 4 __ __ 
Submitted 7 __ __ 
Identification ongoing 1 18 __ 
Identified SVHC 195 16 260 
Withdrawn 9 __ 1495 
Total 216 16 315 
Table 1: Description of the status of substances on RoI. 
In what follows, I discuss some key findings based on the analysis of the information available on 
RoI. 
 
4. Key Findings 
 
4.1 Few key countries submit the majority of the dossiers and provide most of the 
input to the deliberation process 
 
Only a handful of countries (Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria) account for 
more than 60% of the dossiers submitted, while ECHA accounts for almost 30%. Germany, France, 
and the Netherlands, some of the largest chemical producers in EU, account for about 40% of the 
dossiers submitted. Other large producers, such as Belgium and the UK, have been moderately active 
in submitting dossiers (about 2.7% and 1.4% of the total dossiers submitted, respectively), while large 
producers such as Spain, Italy, and Turkey have not been active at all. In contrast, smaller producers 
such as Sweden, Austria, Norway, and Denmark have submitted in total about 25% of the dossiers. 
This relatively large figure may be explained by strong environmental concerns (see Figure 1) or by 
the smaller economic importance of the chemical industry to these countries. 
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Figure 3: Dossiers and comments submitted by countries 
As seen in Figure 3, some of the countries that have been active in submitting dossiers have also been 
active in providing comments, e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria. Norway is the 
country that has provided comments for most of the substances for which dossiers have been 
submitted. Belgium and the United Kingdom have also provided comments for a large number of 
substances. Regarding Belgium, a large fraction of the comments have been provided by NGOs, 
which is not strange since Brussels is considered the center for European lobbying and is home to 
many international organizations (Biliouri 1999). As for the UK, most comments have been provided 
by industry and are generally against the listing of the substances, supporting the argument that UK 
firms seem to consider the EU environment, health, and safety regulations too burdensome (Gamble 
2012) 
How is the active participation by some few countries in Europe related to environmental concerns 
and the importance of the chemical industry in these countries? The following sections explore this 
issue. 
 
4.2 A 30% of the dossiers submitted aimed to list substances that are not 
produced in Europe 
 
REACH regulates chemicals commonly used in the EU in industrial processes and intentional 
chemical mixtures and products, which range from cleaning products and paints to clothing, furniture, 
and electrical appliances (e.g., Bergkamp and Herbatschek 2014). To this end, a major requirement of 
REACH is that manufacturers or importers of substances into the EEA in quantities of one metric ton 
or more per year must register the substances with ECHA. Registration is, however, not mandatory 
for SVHC identification, which means that countries can submit dossiers for substances that are not 
currently being manufactured/imported into the EEA.  
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Figure 4: Dossiers submitted and registration of the substances in EEA 
 
As shown in Figure 4, 30% of the dossiers submitted (i.e., 65 dossiers) correspond to substances 
currently not registered with ECHA. Why do countries submit dossiers for substances not registered 
in the EEA? A potential answer to this question is that European countries want to ease the political 
opposition from other member countries by proposing “low-hanging” fruits, e.g., chemicals known to 
be hazardous but whose listing will not affect the economic interests of European countries. Such 
incentive becomes quite apparent given the negative correlation between the frequency of the dossiers 
submitted and the number of countries registering the substance for which the dossier has been 
submitted. Indeed, about 80% of the substances for which dossiers have been submitted are 
produced/imported by no more than five countries. 
An alternative explanation is that European countries want to prevent that such substances are 
produced or imported to the EEA in the future, for example, as an alternative to existing SVHCs. By 
doing do, European countries with stricter domestic chemicals regulations might avoid putting 
national companies at a competitive disadvantage or even ensure that firms that develop non-toxic 
chemical alternatives are properly rewarded. Interestingly enough, Germany and Sweden account for 
almost 50% of the dossiers of substances that are currently not being manufactured/imported into the 
EEA, while ECHA accounts for about 15%.  
As discussed previously, the fact that some companies attempt to influence regulations in such a way 
to enhance their competitive advantage and also to improve the environment is well established in the 
literature (see, e.g., Barret 1992 and Bailey and Thomas 2017). Anecdotal evidence in the case of 
SVHCs is provided by the regulation of phthalates, which are esters of phthalic acid mainly used as 
plasticizers, i.e., substances added to plastics to increase their flexibility, transparency, durability, and 
longevity. Phthalates’ regulation has contributed to the development of non-toxic and biodegradable 
bio-based plasticizers. According to the market outlook report by the European Commission (2019), 
the European market for bio-based plasticizers is young and in need of large investments, but rapid 
growth is expected from the investments that have been made so far. Bio-based plasticizer production 
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in the EU is to a large extent produced in Germany. Moreover, major drivers for the development of 
this market are the restrictions of certain phthalates through REACH. The listing of phthalates 
currently not being produced in the EEA might reduce the risk of regrettable substitution, as those 
phthalate-based plasticizers are cheaper than bio-based alternatives. Possible substitution towards 
hazardous phthalates not currently produced in the EEA can thus be prevented by equal treatment of 
all phthalates classified as SVHCs (regardless of where they are produced).  
Thus, it can be argued that there are legitimate reasons behind the listing of substances that are not 
currently produced in the EEA, as a way to prevent the potential use of hazardous chemicals as 
substitutes to substances already added to the Candidate List. The case of phthalates seems to be a 
good example. However, considering that many German firms have currently invested in phthalate-
free plasticizers it is perhaps not a coincidence that it was Germany the country proposing the listing 
of several phthalate-based plasticizers.  
 
4.3 Countries often submit dossiers for substances that are not produced 
nationally 
 
As described previously, environmental regulations are particularly difficult to implement in countries 
where interest groups are more likely to oppose them. Table 2 presents the number of dossiers 
submitted by countries depending on whether the country is a country of operation (a country is a 
country of operation when there is at least one company producing or importing the chemical in that 
country). As shown in Table 2, it is clear in the case of SVHCs that the national production of the 
substances significantly reduces the incentives to submit a dossier. Out of the 155 dossiers submitted 
by Member States, only a third was submitted by Member States that are a country of operation.4 The 
incentive to not submit dossiers for substances produced nationally is particularly striking in the cases 
of Sweden, Austria, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark, and much attenuated in the case of Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. 
A review of the dossiers of the substances proposed by a country of operation indicates that the 
majority of these dossiers are motivated by concerns of exposure-related carcinogenicity by the 
general population or by children’s exposure to the chemicals. Such health concerns seem to 
overcome the focus on the protection of the industry and lead to requests to increase the stringency of 
the regulations. The listing of formamide (proposed by Germany) provides an example. Formamide is 
classified as a reprotoxic substance. The presence of formamide in children’s puzzle toys at the end of 
the year 2010 generated a wide concern from the public. An assessment of the risk concerning 
formamide in puzzle mats showed that exposure of both children and adults occurs principally 
through inhalation, dermal contact and orally due to sucking and/or chewing on toys. Even though 
there is a low risk of exposure, this cannot be excluded and thus the substance was proposed in an 
attempt to minimize risks to consumers, particularly little children.  
 
 
 
                                                     
4 In line with Figure 4, note that out of 104 dossiers submitted by a country that is not a country of operation, 65 
dossiers correspond to substances that are not produced or imported into the EU in quantities of one metric ton 
or more per year by any country in the EEA. 
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Dossier 
Country 
Is the dossier country a 
country of operation? Total 
NO YES 
Austria 14 0 14 
Belgium 5 1 6 
Denmark 6 0 6 
Finland 1 0 1 
France 11 9 20 
Germany 27 22 49 
The Netherlands 8 10 18 
Norway 7 0 7 
Poland 1 0 1 
Slovakia 1 2 3 
Spain 1 0 1 
Sweden 21 5 26 
United Kingdom 1 2 3 
Total 104 51 155 
 
Table 2: Countries of operation and dossiers submitted 
The listing of p-(1,1-dimethylpropyl) phenol provides a similar example. The scientific evidence 
about the negative effects of this substance on the environment seems conclusive. Based on current 
data and knowledge, such substance is as endocrine disruptor for which a safe level of exposure is 
difficult to derive although it may exist. Moreover, its adverse effects on fish, amphibians and 
invertebrates are persistent as they do not cease after cease of exposure but also occur after exposure 
at sensitive live stages. Regarding health effects, this substance is known to cause severe skin burns 
and eye damage, and allergic skin reaction. Given the strong evidence of high toxicity, the listing of 
this substance was proposed by Germany and France, both of which are countries of operation.  
 
4.4 CMRs are prioritized by ECHA and almost all active countries 
 
As shown in Figure 4, most dossiers submitted so far are aimed to list CMR substances, reflecting the 
fact that cancer prevention is the primary objective of the evaluation of chemicals and that there is a 
strong societal interest in protecting human health, in particular among workers handling the 
substances (see Boobis et al. 2016). Indeed, in the mid-1990s, chemicals could be classified into two 
categories: carcinogens and non-carcinogens. It was postulated that there would be a major reduction 
in cancer incidence if the carcinogens could be identified and replaced with non-carcinogens. This 
idea sparked the use of hazard identification for carcinogenicity, a practice that has continued for 
nearly half a century in a largely unmodified way (see Boobis et al. 2016). 
In contrast to CMRs, a very small number of dossiers submitted so far has concerned PBTs, vPvB, or 
endocrine-disrupting substances. A common problem with such substances is the existence of 
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uncertainties that can lead to a legislative standstill, which in turn can result in undesirable harm to the 
environment and human health. In policy making on environmental issues, there has often been a 
lengthy process between the first scientific early warnings about potentially serious risks to the 
environment and human health, and subsequent policy action to address these risks. Studies show that 
a great deal of damage to the environment and human health could have been avoided by ensuring 
quicker policy responses to early warnings. Policy makers have been more likely not to regulate 
something that was later found to be harmful (a so-called type 1 error) than to error on the side of 
caution and regulate something despite uncertainty about risks to the environment and human health 
(see Eckley and Selin 2004). This seems to be the case of PBTs and vPvB substances. Addressing the 
problems caused by PBTs and vPvB substances is a complex challenge that requires both scientific 
information and political will. Compiling lists of well-known substances of concern based on 
scientific analyses of their persistence and bioaccumulation has been a major focus of regulating 
persistent organic pollutant (POPs). However, there are no definitive persistence and bioaccumulation 
thresholds that separate POPs from non-POPs, and regulators have only been able to set certain 
criteria to facilitate the identification of these substances based on a combination of scientific 
evidence and policy judgements. It is feasible that such large uncertainties have made policy makers 
less likely to propose such substances to the Candidate List, delaying policy action. Furthermore, most 
substances for which dossiers have been withdrawn correspond to PBTs. 
Similar challenges are observed with the listing of endocrine disruptors (EDCs). Despite substantial 
efforts by the scientific community and NGOs to evaluate the effects of EDCs, regulatory 
communities worldwide have been slow to incorporate the chemicals posing endocrine concerns into 
existing legislations (see, e.g., Munck af Rosenschöld et al. 2014), and this becomes apparent also in 
the listing of SVHCs. To date, 19 substances for which dossiers have been submitted have endocrine-
disrupting properties that may be hazardous to human health, the environment, or both. A major 
challenge of identifying EDCs is that their effects depend on both the level and timing of exposure. 
EDCs are suspected of being capable of acting even at very low doses. Exposures are thought to have 
both immediate and more latent consequences, such as a heightened susceptibility to certain diseases 
and dysfunctions later in life. The most sensitive window of exposure to EDCs appears to be during 
critical periods of development (for instance, foetal development and puberty). Limited human 
evidence supports the idea that exposure during these periods may play a role in the increased 
incidence of reproductive diseases, endocrine-related cancers, behavioural and learning problems , 
infections, asthma, and even obesity and diabetes. However, for many of these, evidence is weak and 
it is very difficult to carry out meaningful experimental or epidemiological studies and prove cause 
and effect in humans (Lee and Jacobs 2015). 
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Figure 5: Dossiers submitted by country and toxicology property 
 
4.5 Chemical industry accounts for most of the inputs to the deliberation process 
 
Chemical firms and industry account for almost 50% of all comments; competent authorities (CAs) 
and national organizations (NOs) account for almost 29% of all comments; and finally, NGOs and 
academia account for about 21% of all comments. 
The participation of chemical firms/industry varies across countries, however, with markedly higher 
rates among some of the largest chemical producers in the EU (i.e., Germany, France, and the UK) 
and in Belgium, where many international organizations are located. The participation of CAs and 
NOs is particularly high in Norway and Germany, while NGOs and academia participate to a largest 
extent in countries such as Sweden and Belgium. 
About 90% of the comments provided by CAs, NOs, NGOs, and academia are supportive of the 
inclusion of the respective substance on the Candidate List. In contrast, only about 8.5% of the 
comments from firms and industry are supportive.  
The high participation rates for industry are consistent with previous literature that suggests that broad 
participation in EU policy shaping is unlikely to bring about equal participation from different groups 
of actors. Moreover, EU policy making should in theory not only reflect a multitude of different 
actors, but also ensure representation from different member states. When considering what countries 
the participating actors come from, it is clear that to a very large extent they come from the member 
states with the largest chemical industries.  
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Figure 6: Comments provided by country and type of actor 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 7, there is a positive correlation between the number of comments 
provided by firms/industry and the number of firms registering the substance in the EEA. Such 
positive correlation suggests that the larger the size of the interest group that can be negatively 
affected by the regulation, the larger is the opposition to its implementation.  
 
Figure 7: Number of comments provided by firms/industry vs. number of dossiers 
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Some of the arguments raised by firms and industry challenge the technical and scientific grounds for 
including the substances in question on the Candidate List (e.g., tonnage, wide-spread use, actual 
exposure, availability of appropriate risk management measures, substitution with equally hazardous 
substances, and the validity of the information on the potential risks of the substance). In contrast, the 
supportive comments provided by CAs/NOs and NGOs/Academia tend to emphasize the seriousness 
and irreversibility of the potential health effects, the consequences to society in terms of treatment 
costs, the difficulty of performing studies that can provide accurate estimates of the effects, and the 
strong signal effect to producers that the substance should eventually be stopped and substituted with 
less dangerous ones.  
 
4.6 Most of the comments that support the inclusion of substance on the 
Candidate List come from countries that do not produce the substance 
 
As shown in Table 3, a higher share of supportive comments comes from countries that are not 
countries of operation. In contrast, higher shares of the comments are non-supportive if the country is 
a country of operation. Moreover, in line with Figure 5, we observe that most of the comments from 
the largest chemical producers in EU (i.e., Germany, France, and the UK) tend to not support the 
inclusion of the substances on the Candidate List, especially when the substances are produced 
nationally.  
 
Commenting 
Country 
Supporting Comments Non-Supporting Comments 
Is the commenting country 
a country of operation? 
Is the commenting country a 
country of operation? 
NO YES NO YES 
Austria 70 7 18 10 
Belgium 326 169 128 176 
Denmark 57 1 8 0 
Finland 52 4 11 8 
France 27 13 123 118 
Germany 51 63 60 296 
The Netherlands 58 29 17 26 
Norway 172 6 4 3 
Slovakia 7 0 6 0 
Spain 0 0 17 38 
Sweden 211 25 14 4 
United Kingdom 81 32 63 143 
Total 1,112 349 469 822 
 
Table 3: Countries of operation and type of comment  
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Notably, the average number of non-supporting comments is statistically smaller for those substances 
that are not currently produced in Europe, e.g., for such substances the average number of non-
supportive comments is equal to 3.82 vs. 10.27 non-supportive comments for substances produced in 
Europe.  
 
 5. Conclusions 
 
The implementation of environmental policies affects interest groups that stand to gain or lose from 
different types of regulatory interventions. Regulatory processes and outcomes depend on the 
magnitude and distribution of the costs and benefits of various regulatory interventions, the structure 
of the affected interest groups, the prevailing economic conditions, and the nature of political, 
regulatory and legal institutions within which various groups pursue their self-interest. In this paper, I 
analyze the incentives of countries to submit dossiers to include chemical substances on the Candidate 
List of substances of very high concern and to participate in the public consultation process leading to 
deliberations and final decisions by the Member State Committee. The Candidate List is a mandatory 
disclosure program that creates requirements for producers, importers, and distributors of products 
containing SVHCs to communicate information about risks and necessary risk management measures 
to the recipients of the products. Inclusion of a substance on the Candidate List also triggers a 
prioritization process that might lead to the inclusion of the substance on the Authorization List. A 
substance subject to authorization cannot be placed in the market for use on its own, in mixtures, or 
incorporated into an article unless the use has been specifically authorized. Since inclusion of a 
substance on the Candidate List is a prerequisite for the inclusion on the Authorization List, it is in the 
economic interest of the chemical industry that substances that they produce are not included on the 
Candidate List.  
From the analysis of the data collected in the Registry of Intentions (RoI), it is clear that economic 
motives have shaped the list. National economic interests have affected not only the decisions to 
submit a dossier but also what substances to propose for inclusion on the list. In particular, the data 
reveals that thirty percent of the substances listed so far are not currently produced in the European 
Economic Area and that most countries submitting dossiers propose substances that are not produced 
nationally. This is to say, countries submit dossiers mainly for substances where they expect little 
opposition from other member countries or from domestic actors.  
The fact that a large share of substances listed is not produced in the European Economic Area 
suggests that the interests of the chemical industry and the regulators can be congruent when 
environmental regulations confer a competitive advantage to the domestic industry at the expenses of 
foreign rivals. On the one hand, the disclosure mechanism embedded in the Candidate List should 
discourage the use of such substances in European countries with less stringent regulations, 
preventing thus regrettable substitutions and their negative environmental effects. On the other hand, 
there is a potential danger in the strategic use of environmental regulation if market power by 
domestic firms is enhanced as a consequence of the listing of substances not produced in the EEA, 
disfavoring consumers which might have to pay much higher prices. Regulators must be careful to 
create incentives for strategic behavior that can protect the environment, but not at the same time 
provide opportunities for increased market power. 
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The data also shows that cancer prevention is a major driver of the inclusion of substances on the 
Candidate List. Yet, regulation of persistent substances seems to be challenging. Anecdotal evidence 
of the difficulties of regulating persistent substances is provided by the fact that a majority of the 
substances withdrawn from the process are PBTs. Some scientists argue that persistence is in fact the 
single most important factor affecting chemical exposure and risk. Because of uncertainty about 
chemical properties, a situation could arise where accumulations have already occurred by the time 
evidence is gathered about a chemical’s propensity for harm. As already experienced in the case of 
persistent ozone-depleting chemicals, the disruptive effects may not be discovered until they occur on 
a global scale and are affecting a vital earth system process. 
The data also shows that firms provide most of the input in the public consultation process, which is 
intended to give interested actors such as companies, scientists, and civil society representatives the 
opportunity to submit evidence regarding the substance. Though meant to be democratic, this process 
is unlikely to bring about equal participation by different groups of actors. 
As discussed in the paper, evidence suggests that the process of including substances on the Candidate 
List has been rather slow with only a small share of all substances known to have SVHC properties 
being listed so far. The political economy of the listing offers a clear explanation to the slow action 
since member states interested in the regulation of SVHC should naturally start by proposing 
substances for which there is little political opposition since submitting a dossier also comes at a cost 
to the country and a risk that the country fails to achieve the goal that the substance is included on the 
Candidate List. Thus, there is a clear trade-off between banning dangerous chemicals, on the one 
hand, and minimizing political opposition on the other. In other words, low-hanging fruits are picked 
first, but it might become more difficult over time to propose chemicals for which there is no political 
opposition. Thus, one can question to what extend the design of the procedures leading to the 
inclusion on the Candidate List can ensure that the risks posed by SVHC are timely and properly 
controlled, and whether alternative procedures, as listing based on expert judgments would not be a 
desirable alternative. Finally, though the data seems to suggest that human health – particularly cancer 
prevention– has been a major focus of the regulation, it is not possible to draw any conclusion on 
whether the listing of SVHC have resulted in the regulation of the most hazardous chemicals in the 
market. This, because investigating such a question would require the comparison of the 
hazardousness of the substances on the Candidate List vs. other all substances in the European market. 
Nevertheless, this is suggested as an area for further research that can make use of the chemical data 
available on the REACH registration dossiers. 
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